[8]
And yet there is still another classification of
duties: we distinguish between “mean” 1 duty, so called, and “absolute” duty. Absolute duty we
may, I presume, call “right,” for the Greeks call it
κατόρθωμα, while the ordinary duty they call καθῆκον.
And the meaning of those terms they fix thus: whatever is right they define as “absolute” duty, but
“mean” duty, they say, is duty for the performance
of which an adequate reason may be rendered.
1 Cicero's technical terms are difficult because he has to invent them to translate Greek that is perfectly simple: rectum is 'right,' i.e. perfect, absolute. Its opposite is medium, 'mean,' i.e. intermediate, falling short of the ' absolute' and occupying a middle ground; common; ordinary.
honestum is ' morally right'; as a noun, 'moral goodness' (= honestas); its opposite is turpe, 'morally wrong. honestas is 'moral rectitude,'—'moral goodness'; 'morality '; its opposite turpitude, 'moral wrong,' ' immorality.' honestus, on the other hand, is always 'honourable '; and honores are always ' offices of honour.'
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
The Annenberg CPB/Project provided support for entering this text.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.